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Abstract: This contribution shows that holding securities through chains of intermediaries 
compromises the ability of investors to exercise their rights.  This problem is not remedied by 
Geneva Securities Convention (‘the Convention’ or ‘GSC’). It will be argued in the paper that 
research should be carried out to determine if a mechanism can be created that enables 
ultimate investors to hold securities directly.  Further work on creating a harmonized set of 
rules at a functional level will not improve legal certainty, reduce systemic risk or enhance 
market efficiency. The problems associated with the current framework are a function of the 
process of intermediation itself. Legal and systemic risk and market efficiency are adversely 
affected by the number of intermediaries operating in this context. Law cannot help here. 
Structural reform can. It is worth investigating if a framework can be created that allows for 
securities to be held directly by ultimate investors. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to analyze the rules on transfers of securities 
contained in the Geneva Securities Convention (‘the Convention’ or ‘GSC’). The 
analysis will be carried out by reference to the shortcomings the Convention was 
designed to address. It will be shown that, instead of perpetuating existing levels 
of intermediation by creating more harmonized rules on intermediated holdings, 
research should be carried out to determine if a mechanism can be created that 
enables ultimate investors to hold securities directly. Further work on creating a 
harmonized set of rules at a functional level will not improve legal certainty, 
reduce systemic risk or enhance market efficiency. The problems associated with 
the current framework are a function of the process of intermediation itself. Legal 
and systemic risk and market efficiency are adversely affected by the number of 
intermediaries operating in this context. Law cannot help here. Structural reform 
can. It is worth investigating if a framework can be created that allows for 
securities to be held directly by ultimate investors.   
The chapter will also briefly discuss the target2securities project that has 
recently been set up by the European Central Bank. The aim of the project is to 
create a computer programme that will link intermediaries with each other. This 
will make it possible for securities to be transferred between intermediaries using a 
common set of technical specifications. The hope is that this will reduce 
settlement cost and also kick start competition between existing providers. The 
chapter will show that the target2securities project is unlikely to reduce numbers 
of intermediaries and that the current momentum should be used to investigate if 
a direct holding system that spans across borders can be created.  
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the shortcomings that the Geneva 
Securities Convention was designed to address. It will be shown that the study 
group intended for the Convention to create a framework for reform that would 
remedy specific instances of legal uncertainty. It was also hoped that the 
Convention would assist developing countries to put in place appropriate legal 
rules.  The negotiations between the member states of UNIDROIT, however, have 
led to the Convention containing a set of rules that are common to a considerable 
number of jurisdictions rather than a set of rules that address particular instances 
of legal uncertainty that were previously identified. 
The result is that the Convention provides jurisdictions with inspiration as to 
roughly what kind of outcomes their law should aim for.  It does not, however, 
enable those drafting documentation, legal advice or national legislation to put in 
place solutions that are more certain than the solutions already in place. 
The thesis of this chapter is that legal uncertainty is created by intermediation 
itself and that it increases with each intermediary that is added to the chain. It is 
time to discuss structural reform that reduces the number of intermediaries and 
also enables issuers and ultimate investors to communicate directly. It seems that it 
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should be possible to create a model for holding and transferring securities that 
provides for a transparent link between issuers and ultimate investors. 
 
 
 
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT 
 
In order to determine what contribution the GSC has made and what further 
contribution can be made in this area of the law, it is worth remembering the 
context in which the work on the Convention started. At the time a number of 
reports were published that identified significant problems in relation to the 
transfer and holding of securities at a global level and also across Europe.1 These 
were the fact that there are too many intermediaries, that differences in market 
practice and law increase cost and the fact that the legal regimes supporting the 
settlement infrastructure contained legal uncertainty. These problems will be 
discussed in turn below. 
 
(1) TOO MANY INTERMEDIARIES 
 
One concern that was raised was the number of intermediaries operating in this 
branch of the financial services industry. The Lamfalussy report highlighted that ‘a 
large number of transaction and clearing and settlement systems […] fragment 
liquidity and increase cost, especially for cross border clearing and settlement’.2 
Reports were cited according to which cross border settlement within the EU was 
ten times more expensive than settlement in the US through the centralized 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation. The gap was even larger when central 
counterparty and clearing services were added to the analysis.3 The first 
Giovannini report observed that the EU infrastructure in clearing and settling 
trades is ‘highly fragmented’. When the Giovannini report was written, there 
existed across Europe 19 local entities and two international entities whose 
primary business it was to play a role in clearing and settlement.4  
The situation is not much different at present.  The European Central Bank 
put together material illustrating the complexity of settlement in Europe in 
comparison with the relatively straightforward settlement mechanism in the US 
and lamenting the ‘very high cost of cross-border settlement’ as well as the 
                                                     
1 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, Int-4. 
2 Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 
(February 2001) 10, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm (last visited 4 September 
2013). 
3 Lamfalussy Report, 82; see also Alberto Giovannini, ‘Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements in the European Union’ (November 2001), excerpt from the foreword and p ii. The 
Giovannini report is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary8035_en.htm (last visited 4 
September 2013). 
4 First Giovannini report, pp i-ii. 
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‘complex settlement procedures and high level of risk’.5 The 2012 Kay Review 
stressed that the cost of holding intermediated securities and carrying out 
transactions with them increases with the number of intermediaries involved. Each 
of them must cover the cost of operating facilities and employing staff and on top 
of that most intermediaries must earn sufficient money to reward their investors.6  
Intermediation also increases legal risk. Each of the intermediaries forming a 
particular chain uses documentation. This documentation should operate to pass 
the interest from the issuer to the ultimate investor. Complete synchronization is, 
however, impossible to achieve. Notwithstanding careful drafting, it is impossible 
to pass down an interest from an issuer to the ultimate investor through several 
layers of intermediation without friction. 
The limitations of documentation in chains of intermediation have recently 
been illustrated by the UK High Court decision in Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl 
GmbH which was decided on 23 January 2013.7 The case concerned a public 
limited company incorporated in England (DNick Holding plc). It was managed 
and operated from Germany. Its shares were only listed in Germany. The directors 
of the company decided to cancel the German listing and to convert the company 
from a public limited company to a private limited company. It called an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting where a resolution was passed approving the 
re-registration of the company as a private company. This was opposed by three 
minority shareholders. They tried to rely on the UK Companies Act 2006, s 98. 
According to this section, ‘the holders of not less in the aggregated than 5% in 
nominal value of the company’s issued share capital’ may apply to court for a 
cancellation of the resolution. On the hearing the court may make an order 
cancelling or confirming the resolution. It may also make an order that an 
arrangement may be made to the satisfaction of the court for the purchase of the 
interests of dissentient members. 
Shares in listed companies are worth more than shares in private companies. 
The lack of a ready market in which minority shares can be sold reduces the 
number of willing buyers. The value of the shares of the minority shareholders 
was therefore reduced as a result of the delisting. Normally this problem would be 
addressed by take-over rules. It appears that the shareholders in Eckerle were not 
protected by the UK or the German takeover rules. The minority shareholders 
therefore relied on CA 2006, s 98. They wanted to be bought out. To benefit from 
that section they had to show that they were ‘holders’ of at least 5% of the share 
capital. They held 7.2% of the shares or at least they thought they did. 
The problem in this case was that the investors’ names were not on the 
shareholder register. The register of shareholders mentioned Dr Platt holding 1 
                                                     
5 Available at http://www.ecb.int/paym/t2s/about/shared/img/eu-trading-landscape.jpg (last visited 4 
September 2013). 
6 The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, Final Report, July 2012  available at: 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/kayreview> Para 3.7 (last visited 4 September 2013). 
7 [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch). 
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share and The Bank of New York Depository (Nominees) Ltd holding 5,671,317 
shares. BNY held the shares on trust for Clearstream AG. Clearstream AG kept 
accounts through which it held ‘Clearstream Interests’ for its account holders. 
These were held through Clearstream AG accounts. Clearstream account holders 
are not individuals but banks or other financial institutions. These act for other 
banks or financial institutions or the ultimate beneficiary.8 
The ultimate German investors wanted to exercise rights under the English 
Companies Act to be bought out upon re-registration of the company. Justice 
Norris found that the claimants were not literally speaking the holders of 7.2% of 
the shares, they were only holders of ‘the ultimate economic interests in underlying 
securities amounting to a specified percentage of shares held by BNY on trust for 
Clearstream account holders whose customers the claimants are’. This was not 
good enough for them to be able to exercise rights under Companies Act 2006, s 
98. 
The documentation used in that case apparently tried to address this problem, 
but failed. It is possible for an English registered company to make provisions in 
its articles enabling a member to nominate another person or persons as entitled 
to enjoy or exercise all or any specified rights of the member in relation to the 
company (CA 2006, s 145). In Eckerle, the articles contained such provisions. 
Article 79.2 of DNick’s articles provided that ‘each person who is a CI 
[Clearstream Interest] holder’ can either direct the registered holder of the share 
how to exercise the vote attaching to the relevant underlying share or to appoint a 
proxy to do so. It appears that the ultimate investors attempted to persuade the 
judge that they were able to rely on this provision arguing that they were holders 
of Clearstream Interests.9 
They failed because the definitions contained in the articles defined the term 
‘CI Holder’ as the holder of ‘an interest in the shares in the capital of the 
Company traded and settled through Clearstream’. They are identified on ‘the 
electronic register of CI Holders […] maintained by Clearstream’. The judge found 
that ‘[t]he only interests traded and settled through Clearstream are the interests of 
Clearstream account holders. Only banks and financial institutions which are 
Clearstream account holders, and between whom those trades are conducted and 
settled on the exchange, and whose trades are recorded on the electronic register, 
fit this description.’10 
To an English lawyer this conclusion is obvious. A German lawyer looking at 
the articles of DNick Holdings would be forgiven for not spotting this as a 
problem. The German model, which in this respect would seem to also apply to 
foreign securities (albeit on the basis of the German notion of Treuhand), assumes 
that the ultimate investor has an interest in the underlying instrument. This is 
evidenced by the fact that DNick shares were listed with a UK securities number 
on the German stock exchange which can only mean that even the German listing 
                                                     
8 Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch) para 14 (d). 
9 Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch) para 14 (h). 
10 Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch) para 14 (h). 
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authorities thought that UK shares were listed. This is remarkable because it was 
impossible for DNick shares to be listed. These shares were owned by Dr Platt 
and the nominee company. Clearstream only held a beneficial interest, but was not 
a shareholder. It can be speculated that the German investors also thought that 
they held UK shares only to find out that English law would not recognize them 
as shareholders. 
What Eckerle demonstrates is that drafting mistakes happen even when two 
legal systems are connected that have a very sophisticated set of rules, are close to 
each other and between which there is frequent interaction. We can assume that 
the lawyers drafting the documentation for Clearstream and the other 
intermediaries knew the law well and tried their very best in good faith to advise 
their respective clients. 
The problem is that documentation is bilaterally agreed between the parties of 
the contract. In an intermediation chain there is a contract (contract 1) between 
the Central Securities Depository (CSD) and the intermediary directly connected 
with the CSD (Intermediary 1). Intermediary 1 then has a contract (contract 2) 
with Intermediary 2. Intermediary 2 has a contract (contract 3) with Intermediary 
3. Intermediary 3 has a contract (contract 4) with Intermediary 4.  To stop here 
let’s assume that Intermediary 4 has a contract (contract 5) with the ultimate 
investor.  
Contract 1 is negotiated with the advice of lawyers acting for the CSD and 
Intermediary 1 respectively. The lawyers owe their duties to their clients. They are 
not instructed by the ultimate investor or by anyone else further up the chain. It is 
their mandate to protect the interests of Intermediary 1 and the CSD respectively. 
It is not within their remit to determine if contract 2, 3, 4 or 5 are written in a way 
that adequately synchronizes them with contract 1. The lawyers drafting contract 1 
do not owe a duty to the ultimate investor requiring them to ensure that all 
contracts synchronize so that the interests is passed down without friction to him.  
Contract 2 is then written with the help of lawyers acting for Intermediary 1 
and 2 respectively. Again, the lawyers advising the parties are bound by their 
professional duties to look after their respective clients only. At this level the 
lawyers of Intermediary 1 need to make sure that contract 2 fits with contract 1, 
but this synchronization does not necessarily work for the benefit of the ultimate 
investor. The lawyers of intermediary will ensure that Intermediary 1 does not 
expose itself to liability by promising anything to Intermediary 2 that it cannot 
deliver with a very high degree of certainty. Erring on the side of caution the 
lawyers would be forgiven for causing Intermediary 1 to owe a smaller set of 
duties to Intermediary 2 than the CSD owes to Intermediary 1. They would, for 
example, ensure that their client has a reasonable amount of time for the passing 
on of instructions or payments to the level immediately below or above them. 
They would also reject liability for any mistakes that happen at other levels. Taken 
together time and mistakes add up to the detriment of the ultimate investor. 
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The process of drafting documentation repeats itself at each level that is 
added to the chain. This has the effect of watering down the interest of the 
ultimate investor. If ultimate investors are retail customers they are likely to accept 
the standard terms offered to them by the intermediary they have chosen. Even if 
an ultimate investor is able to and interested in negotiating the terms of contract 5 
which he enters into with Intermediary 4, he does not have the right to see 
contracts 1, 2, 3 or 4 or request amendments to these contracts.   
Even at national level each layer of documentation that is added to the chain 
inserts new uncertainty. This is notwithstanding the fact that the lawyers 
concerned will have a similar understanding of the legal rules. 
Linking multiple contracts across more than one jurisdiction is even more 
difficult.11 The reason is that local legal systems are underpinned by legal rules that 
are difficult to understand from an outsider’s perspective. For example English 
law uses trust law to analyze the holding of intermediated securities. This makes it 
difficult for lawyers from outside the common law world to understand which 
rights investors have and how these rights are transferred. The German analysis 
maintains that possession in securities documents changes when they are 
transferred in circumstances where there exists only one global certificate which is 
stored centrally. Most German lawyers will be able to fully understand all the 
implications of this approach. English lawyers will find it difficult to have the same 
level of understanding of the German rules. The fact that the lawyers writing the 
documentation will have a limited understanding of foreign rules on securities will 
be reflected in the way the documentation is drafted and that creates legal 
uncertainty. It would seem that harmonization of law can help here. If rules 
become more similar across borders, the potential for misunderstanding foreign 
rules could be reduced. 
 
(2) DIFFERENCES IN MARKET PRACTICE AND LAW INCREASE COST 
 
Cost in relation to cross border transactions is also high because of differences 
between the different national providers, ‘that provide very different types of 
services, have different technical requirements/market practices, and operate 
within different tax and legal frameworks’. To overcome these differences, market 
participants must pay for ‘extra back-office facilities’ to operate the various 
systems. Differences in market practice and law also create ‘opportunity costs in 
the form of inefficient use of collateral, a higher incidence of failed trades and 
trades that are simply foregone because of the difficulties involved in post-trade 
processing across borders’.12 
                                                     
11 For a recent illustration of this problem see Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 
(Ch). 
12 First Giovannini report, p ii; Oxera, Monitoring prices, costs and volumes of trading and post trading 
services (MARKT/2007/02/G) Report prepared for the European Commission DG Internal Market and 
Services, May 2011; the problem of different market practice has also been recently recognized by the 
ECB which is currently trying to harmonize market practice through the target2securities project, 
available at https://www.ecb.int/paym/t2s/html/index.en.html, (last visited 4 September 2013).   
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Differences in law require market participants to arrange for legal advice 
explaining and evaluating the rules applicable in other countries against the 
background of the national framework. Legal opinions cost money. This cost is 
higher if the system the opinion relates to is substantially different from the system 
for which the opinion is required. It will take lawyers longer and will require more 
input from and interaction with local counsel if there are significant differences 
between the two. It is possible for such differences to cause investors to conclude 
that a transaction cannot go ahead for reasons of legal uncertainty. In theory, 
making laws more similar could help to reduce this problem. 
 
(3) LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
Another problem that troubles this area of the law is that recent years have seen a 
change-over from paper to electronic settlement in many jurisdictions. This 
change-over needs to be absorbed by law.13 Property law has historically evolved 
around tangible objects that are held directly by individuals. Securities are 
intangibles and are transferred and held electronically and through intermediaries. 
The process of accommodating a new market practice is bound to create legal 
uncertainty. Adequate drafting of the legal framework supporting the change helps 
to make the transition smooth and limits the impact on market efficiency. 
 
(4) A CONVENTION AS A MEANS TO ACHIEVE LEGAL CERTAINTY? 
 
While a convention is unable to reduce the number of intermediaries or 
operational differences between different national providers, it is possible for an 
instrument like a convention to help reduce problems of law and legal certainty. 
Three instances of legal uncertainty have been identified above. Legal uncertainty 
arises when multiple layers of documentation need to be synchronized in 
particular in a cross border context, when legal opinions about foreign systems are 
put together, and when property law needs to be adapted to electronic and 
intermediated holdings and transfers. 
In principle, a convention can help to improve legal certainty in these 
instances. If laws are more similar, lawyers will be able to better understand the 
solutions implemented in other legal systems. Similarity reduces the potential for 
misunderstandings. The better those who create the documentation understand 
the systems their contracts are linking the more comprehensive and reliable the 
text they put together will be. Lawyers drafting the documentation necessary to 
establish a chain of intermediaries are likely to deliver better quality work if the 
differences between the systems they are linking are fewer in number. This can 
increase legal certainty. 
                                                     
13 Luc Thévenoz, 'The Geneva Securities Convention: objectives, history and guiding principles' in Pierre-
Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thévenoz, Intermediated Securities (CUP 2013) 6-12. 
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Similarly, harmonized rules can make it easier for lawyers to write opinions 
evaluating a foreign system for the purposes of their clients. They will be better 
able to appreciate the advice they receive from local counsel if the foreign system 
is supported by a framework that is similar to their own framework. This can, in 
theory, help to improve legal certainty by improving the quality and reliability of 
legal opinions that support intermediated holdings of securities. 
A convention can also make a contribution by providing rules that help 
increase levels of legal certainty at a national level. This would be the case when 
there are questions of uncertainty in a particular Contracting State and the 
convention helps to clarify these questions. 
 
 
 
C. AIMS OF THE GENEVA SECURITIES CONVENTION 
 
(1) RECITALS 
 
Judging from the recitals to the GSC, the drafters have attempted to address the 
problems that have been described above. The GSC sets out to protect persons 
that acquire or otherwise hold intermediated securities.14 It was designed to reduce 
legal risk, systemic risk and associated costs in relation to domestic and cross-
border transactions involving intermediated securities so as to facilitate the flow of 
capital and access to capital markets.15 Other aims were to ‘enhance the 
international compatibility of legal systems as well as the soundness of domestic 
and international rules on intermediated securities’ and to ‘establish a common 
legal framework for the holding and disposition of intermediated securities’.16 At 
the beginning of the project the study group concerned set out ‘to draft an 
international instrument capable of improving the worldwide legal framework for 
securities holding and transfer, with special emphasis on cross-border situations’.17  
There is also evidence that the study group wanted to create a framework assisting 
developing countries to put in place appropriate rules.18 
 
(2) REFLECTION OF THESE AIMS IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
CONVENTION 
 
To further these aims, the Convention focuses on securities accounts and aims to 
ensure that the rights of account holders are robust in the insolvency of the 
intermediary and also against claims from third parties. This was considered 
                                                     
14 Recital 2 GSC. 
15 Recital 3 GSC. 
16 Recitals 4 and 5 GSC. 
17 UNIDROIT 2003 - Study LXXVIII – Doc. 8, p 2. 
18 UNIDROIT 2004 - Study LXXVIII - Doc. 12 (International UNIDROIT Seminar, November 2003), 
p 3. 
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necessary to reduce systemic risk and to enhance market efficiency.19 Otherwise 
the specific rules contained in the Convention have not been explained in the 
Official commentary by reference to legal, systemic risk or market efficiency. 
It is also worth noting that the aims stated in the recitals have been 
implemented adopting a ‘minimalist approach’. The Official Commentary sets out 
that a harmonized rule was regarded to be appropriate only if it was clearly 
required to reduce legal or systemic risk or to promote market efficiency.20 This 
would suggest that thought was given to the question of subsidiarity. It would 
seem that the contributors to the project would identify weaknesses of the 
respective current domestic systems determining the particular rules that lead to 
legal uncertainty at the respective national levels. It would have made sense then to 
determine whether, to what extent and across which borders legal uncertainty 
exists in international transactions. The contributors would then have been in a 
position to identify the legal rules that cause problems in the jurisdictions 
concerned. Following from that, they would have assessed the gravity of the 
problem in light of systemic risk and market efficiency to determine whether to 
intervene. Only after that, thought would have been given to drafting a set of rules 
with a view to remedying specific problems. 
There is evidence that this is how the study group intended the project to 
progress. At the beginning of the project the group identified a number of 
problems that were subject to legal risk and that had systemic implications and 
linked those to particular topics that they considered required regulation.21 The 
members of the study group also embarked on a number of fact fining missions to 
determine to what extent and in what particular way problems of legal certainty, 
systemic risk and market efficiency arose.22 
The Official Commentary, however, does not set out to what extent the 
provisions adopted in the final text of the Convention responds to particular legal 
uncertainties and how the individual provisions are meant to overcome these 
uncertainties. It also does not contain an explanation as to which particular rules 
currently impact on systemic risk or market efficiency and how the Convention 
helps to mitigate these problems. 
This may be because the drafting process of the Convention was too complex 
to make it possible to determine at the end which provisions relate to the 
problems that were identified at the start of the process. It also seems that the 
discussions between national delegations changed the focus of the project. There 
                                                     
19 UNIDROIT 2003 - Study LXXVIII – Doc. 8, p 6. 
20 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, Int-21. 
21 UNIDROIT 2002 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 5, pp 1-4 and pp 7-10; UNIDROIT 2003 – Study LXXVIII – 
Doc. 12, pp 5-17; UNIDROIT 2004 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 19, p 7-11. 
22 See e.g.: UNIDROIT 2003 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 7; information about these fact finding missions can 
be found at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/2009intermediatedsecurities/study78-archive-
e.htm (last visited 4 September 2013). 
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are contributions by national delegations or organizations referring to particular 
instances of legal uncertainty.23 
There is, however, also evidence that some national delegations and 
representatives were approaching their contributions with a view to preserving 
their own system rather than working out what concerns there were in terms of 
legal and systemic risk or in relations to market efficiency and what changes are 
required to address these concerns.24 Representatives of the French and German 
banking sector, for example, expressed in very clear terms that they would not 
want their national approach to change. It is worth noting that their respective and 
joint interventions were not substantiated by reference to legal risk, systemic risk 
or market efficiency. There is no analysis linking these contributions to the various 
instances of risk identified at the outset of the project. There is also no exploration 
as to the way in which a change would affect risk and efficiency and whether any 
change of national law would be outweighed by benefits that may come from that 
change.25 The Spanish delegation also pointed out that ‘for Spain it is of the 
utmost importance that the project does not interfere with the legal regime on 
which the Spanish “double-tiered single registry system” is based’.26 Other 
examples are a contribution by Argentina requesting that the national rule that 
collateral can only be given to the intermediary by way of an entry on the securities 
account be integrated into the Convention and a similar contribution by Brazil that 
amendments be made to accommodate the local law requesting a book entry for a 
valid transfer of securities.27 Again these contributions are not engaging with a 
discussion on particular risk patterns or questions of market efficiency. 
While there appear to have been distinct goals and also particular instances of 
risk that were on the minds of the drafters when the project began, the discussion 
appears to have moved away from these as the negotiation process progressed. 
Reading through some the national contributions it is easy to agree with the 
observation that ‘law is a great protectionist technique’.28  
To be sure, there may be reasons to object to change from the perspective of 
legal certainty, systemic risk or market efficiency.  The fact that none of the 
contributors justified their intervention by reference to these reasons, but simply 
                                                     
23 See e.g. the contribution made by the Deputy General Counsel of the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation UNIDROIT 2003 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 11, pp 12-15. 
24 See e.g. the contributions made by Euroclear (UNIDROIT 2004 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 16) 
concerning the liability of intermediaries. 
25 Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (UNIDROIT 2004 - Study LXXVIII – Doc. 16) concerning the 
German ‘proprietary co-ownership structure’; Fédération Bancaire Française jointly with the Association 
Française des Professionnels des Titres regarding the French system (UNIDROIT 2004 – Study LXXVIII – 
Doc. 16, App 1) and also the joint statement of the Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, the Fédération 
Bancaire Française and the Association Française des Professionnels des Titres (UNIDROIT 2004 – Study 
LXXVIII – Document 16, App 1). 
26 UNIDROIT 2005 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 20, p 7. 
27 UNIDROIT 2006 – Study LXXVIII – Doc 38, p 1 (Argentina) and UNIDROIT 2006 – Study LXXVIII – 
Doc. 38, p 1 (Brazil). 
28 UNIDROIT 2003 - Study LXXVIII – Doc. 12, p 9; see also Philipp Paech, ‘Market needs as paradigm – 
breaking up the thinking on EU securities law’ in Pierre-Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thévenoz, 
Intermediated Securities (CUP 2013) 24-25. 
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objected to change can suggest that their aim was to preserve the status quo 
irrespective of whether there were good reasons for doing so.  It is also worth 
noting that the requirement for a ‘political consensus’ was on the minds of the 
study group and is also referred to in the Official Commentary.29 
Notwithstanding the desire to create a framework that reduces legal and 
systemic risk and supports efficient markets, the rules contained in the Convention 
are the result of a decision making process between national delegations each of 
which was hesitant to change its own laws. It can also be speculated that the 
national delegations were mindful to preserve the business interests of their 
respective national industries.30 
 
(3) COMMON PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN REFORM 
 
At an early stage of the project the members of the study group discussed the idea 
to develop two documents. One document would be designed to contain only the 
rules necessary to improve the legal framework in cross border situations. The 
other document would be used to describe the standard for best practice at a 
national level helping national systems to identify shortcomings of their own legal 
framework and guiding them on how to make improvements.31 This approach was 
not implemented. Following the fact finding missions, a number of shortcomings 
of national systems would have been known to those working on the project. No 
attempt was made, however, to develop a framework that could serve as a 
benchmark allowing for a systematic evaluation of questions of legal uncertainty, 
systemic risk and market efficiency in relation to the existing legal regimes. 
Moreover, no attempt was made to make a suggestion for a system, which 
against the background of modern technology would work best both at a national 
level and also in terms of compatibility across borders and what other systems 
could learn from it. It is, for example, quite possible that modern technology has 
rendered intermediation unnecessary and that ultimate customers would and 
should be able to hold securities directly with a central provider without the need 
to interpose and pay for layers of service providers. 
Notwithstanding the aims stated at the beginning of the Convention, the 
reality of the negotiating and drafting process does not appear to have made it 
possible to systematically determine weaknesses of any particular system or cross 
border arrangement and to evaluate and address these against the background of 
legal certainty, systemic risk or market efficiency. The Convention appears more 
like the product of an attempt to set out the common principles prevailing in the 
                                                     
29 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, Int-21; see also UNIDROIT 2002 - Study LXXVIII – Doc. 5, pp 5 and 7; 
UNIDROIT 2003 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 12, pp 1-3. 
30 see also Philipp Paech, 'Market needs as paradigm – breaking up the thinking on EU securities law' in 
Pierre-Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thévenoz, Intermediated Securities (CUP 2013) 25. 
31 UNIDROIT 2003 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 11. 
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jurisdictions concerned rather than as a document addressing particular legal 
problems that have been previously identified in these jurisdictions. 
A focus on finding a common denominator of existing securities regimes is 
visible from the material documenting the drafting process. Great care was, for 
example, taken to ensure that the rules of the Convention did not interfere with 
the so called ‘transparent systems’ that operate in countries such as Brazil, 
Columbia, China, Czech Republic, Greece, Malta, the Nordic Countries, South 
Africa and partly in the United Kingdom. The issues arising out of transparent 
systems were discussed in detail at the fourth session of the Committee of 
Governmental Experts and special provisions were added to accommodate these 
systems.32 
Another example is the genesis of Articles 11 and 12 GSC. The wording 
contained in the first draft was modified because a number of delegations were 
concerned that the Convention might displace or disrupt national provisions 
relating to net settlement. Article 11(5) GSC was introduced to provide that 
nothing in the Convention limits the effectiveness of debits and credits to 
securities accounts which are affected on a net basis in relation to securities of the 
same description.33 
Article 12 GSC provides for three methods which can be used to create a 
security interest or a limited interest, or for a transfer. Article 12 GSC was 
amended during the drafting process to accommodate the fact that the methods 
now contained in Article 12(3) GSC were used for purposes wider than the 
creation of a security interest in some jurisdictions. They were used to confer 
usufruct, a life interest or in the context of repurchase agreements. These 
interventions led to a widening of the scope of Article 12 GSC. 
It has already been mentioned that there are good reasons to be careful about 
amending local law and market practice.  Change can introduce new uncertainties. 
New rules should be introduced only after consideration of whether the risk of 
disruption of the existing mechanism is outweighed by the predicted decrease in 
risk and increase in efficiency. Interestingly, such an analysis was not carried out 
when the drafts were amended. The justification for amending the existing draft 
was simply that national rules or practices existed and therefore had to be 
integrated. No attempt was made to also justify the amendments in terms of the 
overall aims of the Convention and to evaluate the national practices in light of 
these aims. 
Another illustration for the observation that the Convention contains a set of 
principles which States and observers could agree on without having to make 
                                                     
32 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, Int-28, Int-30; significant time was spent during the drafting process to 
research how the existing transparent systems operated and how the Convention can be adapted to their 
requirements.  
33 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 11-7. 
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significant change to their national systems are the frequent references to non-
Convention law and other sources of law outside the GSC.34 
Examples that can be found in the context of the rules on securities transfers 
include: What constitutes a debit or credit is a matter for non-Convention law.35 
Invalidity, reversal and conditions of debits, credits and designated entry are 
determined by non-Convention law (Article 16 GSC).36 Non-Convention law also 
determines the consequences of an unauthorized debit.37 The Convention does 
not set out whom the issuer is required to recognize as a shareholder.38 The 
Convention does not allocate the loss to an intermediary which may result from 
the reversal of a transfer. 
The significance of national law appears to have increased as negotiations 
went on. The Austrian delegation observed towards the end of the drafting 
process that, ‘[I]t must be noted that in the course of the negotiations an 
increasing number of items has been subjected to the “non-Convention law”’.39 
The references to non-Convention law are, again, not explained by an evaluation 
of risk or market efficiency. 
A desire to create common principles rather than finding and addressing 
instances of risk and inefficiencies of the existing framework is also visible in 
individual articles of the Convention. Looking at the provisions this paper is 
designed to focus on, the articles on perfecting a security interest provide for a 
good example. 
The Convention sets out three methods of transferring or creating a security 
interest in intermediated securities in Article 12(3) GSC. These are: If the interest 
is created in favour of the intermediary an agreement with the intermediary 
suffices. If the interest is created in favour of another person a designating entry in 
favour of that person needs to be made or a control agreement in favour of that 
person needs to be entered into. Contracting States may decide which of these 
three options to accept, but must not impose further steps in relation to any of 
them. It is to the credit of the Convention that formal requirements such as 
registration requirements or filing with a governmental agency, notarization by a 
public notary or publication in an official gazette or on the internet are not on the 
list.40 
The list, nevertheless, contains a summary of the main methods of perfection 
for a securities interest that exist in the jurisdictions that form part of the focus of 
                                                     
34 For a comprehensive overview of the references to sources of law outside the GSC see: UNIDROIT 
Committee on emerging markets  issues, follow-up and implementation, 'Information for Contracting 
States in respect of the Convention’s references to sources of law outside the Convention, Document  
UNIDROIT S78B/CEM/2/Doc. 2 (November 2011).  
35 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 17-7. 
36 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 16-9 refers to Art 16 GSC as a ‘prominent example of the limits 
inherent in the international harmonisation of the substantive law of intermediated securities’. 
37 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 15-18. 
38 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 16-15. 
39 UNIDROIT 2007 – Study LXXVIII – Doc. 90, p 1. 
40 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 11-18 – 11-19. 
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those drafting the Convention. The Convention does not attempt to cause 
Contracting States to change their law in this respect. Contracting States do not 
have to accept all of these methods in their jurisdiction. They can choose which 
ones they accept. Moreover, other methods of perfection may continue to create a 
valid interest notwithstanding the fact that they are not listed in the Convention 
(Article 13 GSC). This interest has lower priority than an interest created by a 
Convention method, but is still valid.41 One effect of Article 12(3) GSC is that 
Contracting States have to choose one or more of the methods listed. While it is 
possible that in some legal systems not all of these methods are valid methods it is 
highly unlikely that many jurisdictions exist that do not currently recognize at least 
one of these methods. Using the opting out mechanism has the effect of allowing 
Contracting States to preserve their own system to a significant extent. 
 
(4) CONCLUSIONS 
 
It seems that questions of legal certainty, systemic risk and market efficiency, while 
probably having continued to be on the minds of the national delegations, have 
not been as directly and systematically identified and addressed at the negotiation 
stage of the project as was intended by the members of the study group at the start 
of the project. Notwithstanding what the study group intended, the Convention 
appears to have developed into a text that sets out common principles of existing 
frameworks rather than reforming the local markets, the local legal regimes or the 
existing cross-border arrangements. 
 
 
 
D. IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON LEGAL CERTAINTY 
 
(1) INTRODUCTION 
 
This is not to say that the Convention made no contribution. Although the 
Convention has not come into force yet and has so far been signed by only one 
jurisdiction,42 it seems that it can nevertheless assist legislators that have previously 
had no rules and would like to create a new framework from scratch.43 Perhaps 
the most important contribution of the Convention is the starting point of its 
analysis. Given that securities are held through accounts, approaching the topic 
from the perspective of securities accounts fits well with the topic. Designing 
entries on accounts in a way that makes them resistant to claims from the 
intermediary’s creditors and other adverse claims reflects the current practice in 
                                                     
41 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 19-13 and 13-5. 
42 The status of the Convention can be found at http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
main.htm (last visited 4 September 2013). 
43 It will be shown below, however, that those using the Convention as an inspiration for legislation need 
to be careful to draft a text that fits with the local legal framework [see para 0 to 0]. 
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securities markets better than an analysis build on the property law of tangible or 
intangible objects. 
The Convention and also the analysis carried out during the UNIDROIT 
project made a significant contribution by collecting information on how different 
systems operate. It is also very instructive and helpful from the perspective of 
comparative law to have a set of rules that reflect the common understanding of 
most jurisdictions on this area of the law. 
Another important contribution made by the Convention is that it shows 
how much can be achieved through a process of law reform on a consensual basis. 
The Convention is the product of a monumental effort to persuade national 
delegations from across the world to agree on a common framework. It is to the 
great credit of those running the project that a final text was adopted that the 
UNIDROIT member States felt able to accept. It is also fair to conclude that we 
now have a very good understanding of what can be achieved by harmonizing 
legal rules without reforming the existing set up of the market infrastructure. 
The purpose of this section is to determine to what extent the Convention 
has increased legal certainty. Has it made it possible to draft more reliable 
documentation and legal opinions? Has it helped to resolve issues of legal certainty 
at a national level? It will be shown that the Convention has not made a significant 
contribution to legal certainty and that it is unlikely that further progress can be 
achieved by the harmonization of legal rules. This is an important insight that 
helps to determine how to proceed in the future. 
 
(2) FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
 
The Convention has adopted what has been termed a ‘functional approach’. The 
sixth recital of the Convention explains ‘that a functional approach in the 
formulation of rules to accommodate the various legal traditions involved would 
best serve the purposes of the Convention’. The Official Commentary adds that 
different jurisdictions have different legal formulations, doctrines and histories in 
relation to intermediated securities. The Convention does not attempt to 
harmonize these. It is rather intended to harmonize the result of the rules on 
certain key matters while allowing the Contracting States to maintain or adopt 
their own legal doctrines.44 The drafters of the Convention attempted to use 
language that was considered to be neutral. Neutral language in this context is best 
understood as language that is different from the language used in any of the 
jurisdictions considered in the drafting process. Rules are formulated by reference 
to their results rather than by reference to local legal concepts. In order to avoid 
using terms that have a particular technical meaning in one jurisdiction the drafters 
stayed clear, for example, of notions of ‘property’, ‘ownership’ or ‘equitable 
interest’. The hope was that this would avoid confusion which, it was felt, ‘can 
                                                     
44 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, P-7. 
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easily arise from the different traditions and conceptual frameworks of the 
different systems of law’.45 It has also been observed that the functional approach 
helped to overcome the ‘vast differences in the legal doctrine affecting 
intermediated securities holding systems’ and market structures and also ‘outright 
hostility to and obstruction of the project on the part of one influential state 
participant, namely France’.46 
By introducing neutral language, the Convention attempts to avoid imposing 
ideas from one legal system onto another legal system. The neutral language 
introduced by the Convention, however, does not automatically increase certainty 
and also does not in and of itself eliminate confusion. 
The concepts introduced by the Convention require interpretation. This 
inevitably creates uncertainty. New rules initially also introduce new questions 
because they require interpretation to determine their scope of application against 
the background of the existing framework. This is a price worth paying if the 
uncertainties eliminated by the Convention outweigh the uncertainties created by 
the Convention.  
It seems, however, that the functional approach does not do much to 
eliminate uncertainty. It will be shown below that the functional approach is only 
able to make a very limited contribution.47 This is because it does not significantly 
help those drafting documentation and legal opinion or national legislation to 
improve the quality of their work. 
The Convention sets out outcomes that are to be created by means of 
national legislation. This requires national legislators to become active to modify 
their laws to produce the desired outcomes. Those drafting documentation and 
writing legal opinions will continue to have to investigate the national framework. 
It will be shown below that their work will not be easier and that their documents 
will not be more reliable as a result of the Convention. 
Article 11(1) GSC, for example, provides that an account holder acquires 
intermediated securities by a credit of these securities to that account holder’s 
securities account. Contracting States may not require further steps in addition to a 
credit, but they may specify what constitutes a credit (Article 11(2) GSC).48 
Contracting States therefore need to determine how a requirement for a further 
step (which is banned) is to be distinguished from the specification of what 
amounts to a credit (which is allowed) and that is a new problem of construction 
that increases the level of legal uncertainty. 
                                                     
45 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, Int-20. 
46 Charles W Mooney, jr, ‘The truth about shortfall of intermediated securities – perspectives under the 
Geneva Securities Convention, United States law and the future EU legislation', in see also Philipp Paech, 
'Market needs as paradigm – breaking up the thinking on EU securities law’ in Pierre-Henri Conac, Ulrich 
Segna and Luc Thévenoz, Intermediated Securities (CUP 2013) 160-161 and fn 3. 
47 See also Dorothee Einsele, 'Intermediaer-verwahrte Wertpapiere, Rechtsharmonisierung versus 
Systemneutralitaet' 177 (2013) Zeitschrift fuer das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 50-89. 
48 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 18-10; Luc Thévenoz, ‘Transfer of intermediated securities’ in Pierre-
Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thévenoz, Intermediated Securities (CUP 2013) 147-150. 
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A straightforward example for what is banned can be found in the context of 
Article 18 GSC. Article 18 GSC protects the acquirer of securities against adverse 
claims provided that he acquired the securities for value and acted in good faith. A 
Contracting State should not undermine the protection of the Convention by 
making the validity of a credit dependent upon the validity of a previous credit.49 
There are, however, also less straightforward questions of construction to be 
solved by Contracting States in this context. German law, for example, contains a 
requirement for a contract in rem to be validly concluded for securities to be 
transferred. It would appear that a ‘contract in rem’ in addition to an ‘obligational 
contract’ would be characterized as an additional step required for the transfer, but 
that was apparently not intended by the drafters. The Official Commentary, 
therefore, sets out that it is ‘understood’ that non-Convention law may make the 
validity of a credit dependent on the validity of the transaction or any related 
agreement, such as an agreement in rem which the credit purports to fulfil. Such 
validity requirements therefore are not ‘further steps’ prohibited by Article 11(2) 
GSC.50 
This illustrates the difficulty with functional language. The boundaries of the 
new functional term need to be determined in relation to the concepts existing in 
every Contracting State. Unlike in the context of EU directives, there is also no 
mechanism ensuring that the new term will be understood in the same way by the 
different Contracting States. It is highly likely that starting the analysis against the 
background of their own framework different Contracting States will develop their 
own distinct way of interpreting the provisions of the Convention. Lawyers 
drafting documentation and writing legal opinions must not put in place wording 
or reach conclusions at a broad brush functional level. Detail matters. Even if all 
jurisdictions have attempted in good faith to attribute the characteristics provided 
for in the Convention to a credit, any lawyer looking at another system will still 
need to determine in which instances precisely a credit occurs and also to what 
extent exactly the characteristics suggested by the Convention can be identified in 
the local law and how certain these conclusions are against the background of the 
local framework. 
In relation to German law, for example, foreign lawyers will have to work out 
how the national law has defined the point in time at which securities are acquired. 
Then they need to determine what is meant by a ‘contract in rem’, at what point 
this contract becomes binding, what happens if such a contract is invalid and how 
to translate these notions into their own system. Moreover, even if the Contracting 
State has stepped over the line and requires further steps, there is nothing that can 
be done about that at least as far as the courts of the country that acted contrary to 
the Convention are concerned. From the perspective of the lawyers operating in 
                                                     
49 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 18-10. 
50 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 11-12. 
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this area this possibility needs to be investigated and taken into account regardless 
of whether it is in violation of the Convention or not. 
Certain conclusions, which are necessary to create robust documentation and 
reliable legal opinions, can only be drawn from precisely drafted laws. Results 
formulated in functional terms provide some guidance on what local laws should 
roughly aim for, but do not help to create certain outcomes. The best that can be 
achieved at a functional level is a rough level of similarity that is interesting but 
does not help those having to master the detail. The worst that can come out of 
this process is an illusion of similarity in the minds of lawyers who do not have the 
skill or have not been given the resources to carry out adequate research and this is 
more dangerous in terms of legal risk than certainty that there are differences that 
require careful attention. 
Another example is Article 14(1) GSC which states that rights and interests 
that have become effective against third parties according to Convention rules are 
also effective in the insolvency of the intermediary. This, however, does not affect 
the application of any substantive or procedural rule of the law applicable by 
virtue of an insolvency proceeding (Article 14(2) GSC). The Convention goes on 
to give examples of what is meant by ‘substantive or procedural rules’ of 
insolvency proceedings. The examples referred to are: the ranking of categories of 
claims, the avoidance of transactions as a preference or fraud on creditors or the 
enforcement of rights of property that is under the control or supervision of the 
insolvency administrator. Defining what qualifies as a substantive or procedural 
rule of insolvency law in this context is important because such rules could be 
used by Contracting States to require ‘further steps’ in addition to those listed in 
Article 12 GSC to be complied with for the creation of a valid interest.51 The 
Official Commentary explains that it would be impossible to codify in the 
Convention text a complete listing of exceptions that would prove satisfactory to 
all Contracting States. Such a list would be both over- and under-inclusive when 
taking into account the varying approaches and policies of the Contracting 
States.52 The Official Commentary concludes that ‘it is inevitable that in some 
situations it will be unclear whether a relevant rule of law is triggered by an 
insolvency proceeding’.53 It then goes on to recommend that Contracting States 
when joining the Convention change their law to clarify which rules are covered 
by the exception contained in Article 14(2) GSC.54 
Even if the Convention is implemented across the world, those drafting 
documentation and legal opinions still have to develop a deep understanding of 
the insolvency laws of other jurisdictions to determine precisely to what extent 
insolvency proceedings affect the rights of investors. The devil lies in the most 
minute of details. Lawyers would be negligent to rely on the fact that any particular 
country has joined the Convention to conclude that investors are therefore 
                                                     
51 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 14-8 and 14-9. 
52 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 14-7. 
53 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 14-9. 
54 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 14-10. 
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protected in the insolvency of an intermediary. The Convention has not made 
their work easier and there continues to be ample room for the misunderstanding 
of local rules. 
Art 18 GSC protects an acquirer for value against adverse claims unless he 
knows or ought to know of the interest of another person. The GSC adopts its 
own notion of ‘good faith’. The Official Commentary warns that courts should be 
aware that guidance from the applicable law with respect to the good faith 
purchase of movables more generally may not be appropriate.55 In attempting to 
explain what is meant by ‘ought to know’ the Official Commentary sets out that 
‘no simple example that does not assume actual knowledge can be sufficiently rich 
in factual detail to support a definite conclusion on the “ought to know” issue’.56 
Article 17(c) GSC attempts to identify the circumstances in which an organization 
knows or ought to know of an interest or fact and states that this occurs ‘when the 
interest of fact is or ought reasonably to have been brought to the attention of the 
individual responsible for the matter to which the interest of fact is relevant’. 
It is not straightforward to determine what is meant by ‘ought to know’, 
‘reasonable’ or ‘individual responsible’.57 These notions will require further 
clarification at a national level and it is unlikely that they will be understood in the 
same way across the globe. 
The Convention shows national legislators some of the results they should 
aim for, but it does not help those working towards creating certain legal 
documents for the markets. The level of legal certainty is to a significant extent 
dependent upon the documentation used by the parties concerned. The recent UK 
decision in Eckerle shows how even very sophisticated parties can fail to 
implement contractual rules that produce outcome that on the face of it all parties 
concerned must have intended to achieve.  
This is because it is not difficult to gain a functional understanding of a 
foreign jurisdiction. Most lawyers working in the area will have achieved that 
within a fairly short span of time. What is more difficult is to appreciate the 
implications of small detail and that continues to require a high level of 
understanding of national rules which are well outside the scope of the 
Convention. But even within the scope of the Convention the functional approach 
does not allow lawyers to conclude that the result set out in the Convention has 
been implemented to a sufficient level of certainty. 
Also the help provided by the Convention for the improvement of domestic 
rules is limited. This point can be illustrated by reference to English law. English 
law does not have a rule protecting the good faith purchaser of an equitable 
interest against adverse claims. It is possible for an acquirer of intermediated 
                                                     
55 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 17-7. 
56 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 17-12 and 20-10. 
57 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 17-19. 
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securities to find that his holdings are subject to an earlier defective entry.58 The 
English are aware of this problem.59 
The Official Commentary sets out that the Convention aims to address it. It 
states that the Convention is designed to immunize the acquirer from such claims 
provided he does not know and ought not to know of an earlier defective entry 
and provided he did not acquire by way of gift or otherwise gratuitously.60 Does 
the Convention help England? 
The Convention confirms that it would be right for England to do something 
about this. But that in itself does not increase legal certainty. Legal certainty can 
only be increased by precise wording that fits with the national legislation. In 
terms of drafting a solution that sits squarely with the existing regime the 
Convention does not help. The wording protecting the acquirer at national level 
needs to be chosen carefully in light of the existing regime using local and not 
functional language. Anything else would not increase but reduce legal certainty. 
Those drafting legislation should not use the wording of the Convention and 
reproduce it in the national piece of legislation. 
Interestingly, this point was raised by the Russian Federation during 
negotiations. Under Russian law, international treaties automatically become part 
of national law. There is no constitutional requirement for the Russian Federation 
to pass a specific act transforming international treaties into local law. The Russian 
delegation made the point that this will make it difficult for Russia to join the 
Convention ‘because the terms and legal conceptions used in the draft Convention 
are unknown to the Russian law.’61 
To achieve legal certainty the solution put in place at national level must not 
rely on Convention wording. Any solution must be developed out of the existing 
framework. There is a risk that sloppy drafters might be tempted to copy and 
paste Convention rules and cause significant problems in national legislation that 
would increase the level of uncertainty rather than decrease it. 
 
(3) NON-CONVENTION LAW / SOURCES OF LAW OUTSIDE THE 
CONVENTION 
 
References to non-Convention law which have already been mentioned because 
their number increased during the drafting process also do not help to increase 
legal certainty. Given that the functional approach already limits the effect of the 
Convention to a significant extent, the impact of the Convention is reduced even 
further when references to other sources of law are high in number. 
                                                     
58 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 18-7. 
59 See the project of the Law Commission on Property Interests in Intermediated Securities, materials are 
available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/property-interests-in-intermediate-securities.htm 
(last visited 4 September 2013). 
60 Kanda et al., Official Commentary, 18-7. 
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This can be illustrated by an analysis of Article 11 GSC. Article 11 GSC, 
which states that securities are acquired by the credit to an account, is subject to 
Article 16 which refers to non-Convention law and to the extent permitted by 
non-Convention law the account agreement or the uniform rules of the securities 
settlement system determine whether and in what circumstances a debit, credit, 
designating entry or removal of designating entry is invalid, is liable to be reversed 
or may be subject to a condition and the consequences thereof. The Convention 
also does not determine the nature of the interest acquired. A transfer can 
therefore be analyzed in terms of transferring property from A to B but also in 
terms of extinguishing an interest for the benefit of A and creating a new interest 
for the benefit of B.62 Problems that arise in the context of a cross border 
situation between jurisdictions that use a transfer approach and jurisdictions that 
use a novation approach are as a result not resolved by the Convention. 
These are important matters affecting the rights of investors. If the notion of 
what precisely constitutes a credit, the point in time at which such a credit 
becomes valid, its substantive validity, its reversibility and the effect of conditions 
are left outside the scope of the Convention, the contribution of the Convention 
is reduced to the insight that what matters are robust entries on accounts. This is 
an important insight. The Convention, however, only says that they should be 
robust. The creation of the framework to support such entries is largely left to 
national law, which can be misunderstood and will have to be meticulously 
researched for documentation and legal opinions to provide legal certainty. 
There are also a number of matters in the context of priority of security 
interests that are outside the scope of the Convention. 
Article 12(3) GSC sets out three methods of perfection for an interest in 
intermediated securities. It has already been mentioned that Contracting States can 
choose which of those methods they accept. Their respective choices have an 
impact on the priority rules in Article 19 GSC and can make the analysis more 
complex in relation to priorities.63 Non-consensual security interests such as a 
vendor’s lien are not defined by the Convention and the priority of such interests 
will be determined by the applicable law.64 Moreover, Contracting States may 
provide further methods of perfection (Article 13 GSC). Admittedly, interests 
perfected according to Article 12 GSC have priority over interests created by non-
Convention law.65 The innocent acquirer of intermediated securities or an interest 
therein is protected against prior and later interests created by non-Convention 
law.66 The acquirer of a Convention Article 12 interest also has priority over later 
interests that have been created according to non-Convention law because of 
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Article 19(2) GSC.67 It also is worth noting that buyers or collateral takers that 
have acquired their interest using a non-Convention method are not protected by 
the Convention rules on innocent acquisition of an interest.68 
Lawyers advising in this area need to work out which option or which options 
a particular Contracting State has selected and how they have defined the 
parameters of the option or options. They will also have to determine the extent 
to which non-consensual security interests exist and how they affect other 
interests. In addition they would be ill-advised not to get clarity on the priority of 
interests created by non-Convention law. It would not be safe for a lawyer not to 
determine if these interests do in fact have the reduced effect set out in the 
Convention. 
Frequent references to non-Convention law increase the instances in which 
foreign lawyers need to understand national rules to draw conclusions upon which 
they write an opinion or select wording for documentation. 
 
(4) CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Convention does not help to overcome the problem of synchronizing 
contracts over levels of multiple intermediaries. This problem will continue to 
exist as long as there are multiple layers of intermediaries and it is aggravated by 
each intermediary that is added to the chain. The Convention also does not 
address the problem of drafting documentation with a view to linking transactions 
across borders. 
The Convention uses a functional approach and abstains deliberately from 
using or explaining the concepts prevailing in different jurisdictions. The 
Convention aims to harmonize results thereby hoping to create a situation where 
notwithstanding differences in laws the outcomes are the same. While this may 
cause different systems to achieve identical or at least similar outcomes to a greater 
extent than is the case already, it does not reduce differences between national 
laws and the legal cost arising from these differences. Lawyers cannot conclude 
that their clients are protected on the basis of the analysis that the Convention has 
been implemented and that the results achieved by the Contracting States are 
therefore functionally the same. Neutral language creating a functional model does 
not increase legal certainty. Legal certainty requires precise language. 
Those giving legal advice to market participants will continue to have to 
analyze the national rules to the same level of detail as before. The Convention 
adds to the analysis they need to carry out because legal advisors in addition to 
understanding the foreign framework and approach need to determine the extent 
to which the provisions of the Convention have been implemented and also how 
well this implementation fits with the existing framework. There continues to be 
plenty of room for misunderstanding national rules. The problem that at each level 
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the documentation protects also the interests of the intermediary concerned and 
so waters down the interest of the ultimate beneficiary will continue to exist and 
will continue to be aggravated with the length of the chain. 
 
 
 
E. WHAT WOULD WORK? 
 
Leaving aside the question as to whether political consensus can be found, would 
it help to harmonize the law further? The conclusion of this chapter is that it 
would not. This is because further refinement of common harmonized rules 
perpetuates rather than resolves the problem. The Convention has made a very 
important contribution by showing how far harmonization of law can improve the 
existing intermediated framework. This has shown that some but not significant 
progress can be achieved through that route. 
The starting point towards a solution reducing the cost and uncertainties 
arising out of intermediation has to be that the number of intermediaries needs to 
be reduced and also that a direct connection between issuers and intermediaries 
has to be created. Having determined that there are significant limits to how much 
harmonization can be achieved at a functional level, it is worth asking if it is 
possible to create a system which reduces the number of intermediaries operating 
between issuers and investors and also enables investors to directly connect with 
issuers.  
It seems that a point has been reached where it would be appropriate for 
policy intervention at least at a European level facilitating the emergence of a 
direct and transparent settlement and holding system.  
 
 
 
F. TARGET 2 SECURITIES 
 
The European Central Bank started a project in 2006 exploring the possibility to 
create a pan-European service for securities settlement in the euro area.  A list of 
specifications setting out such a service was published in September 2012.69 The 
development and testing phase began in April 2009 and is scheduled to end in 
March 2014.  User testing is going to begin in March 2014.  The plan is for T2S to 
go live in the first half of 2015.  At that point the first group of central securities 
depositories will start operations on the platform. 
The idea is to create a computer programme for central securities 
depositories, central banks, custodians and other intermediaries to process their 
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respective transfers and record their respective securities holdings. Users will, for 
example, operate to the same time table and use the ISO 20022 messages format.  
The hope is that this will relieve market participants from the requirement to pay 
for back office facilities that accommodate different software specifications.  It is 
also hoped that this will enable market participants to move securities more 
quickly and cheaply between markets to, for example, deliver collateral that is 
presently not needed in one market to another market where it is required.  
The plan is for the target2securities project to be supplemented by an EU 
regulation on Central Securities Depositories.  This regulation is designed to 
abolish national monopolies and enable central securities depositories and other 
intermediaries to operate in all markets.70  The regulation also introduces an 
obligation of dematerialization for most securities, harmonized settlement periods 
for most transactions in such securities, settlement discipline measures and 
common rules for central securities depositories.  
The hope is that the combined effect of a software platform that connects 
intermediaries across border and the abolition of national monopolies should 
facilitate competition between market participants and can, over time, also lead to 
a reduction of numbers of national players. It will be possible for globally acting 
intermediaries to offer their services directly without having to connect to a 
national hub with monopoly status.  It will also be possible for smaller national 
providers to offer their services at an international level to challenge the current 
market leaders. 
This may help to reduce the number of intermediaries.  It is worth noting, 
however, that in the context of the Eckerle case Clearstream would have been able 
to operate as the UK central securities hub. The UK does not operate a 
monopolistic settlement regime.  Under the Uncertificated Securities Regulation 
Clearstream could at present apply to operate a system that competes with Crest.  
Clearstream would have to meet certain technological specifications, but is not 
prevented from accessing the market as a CSD. Clearstream has not yet chosen to 
go down that route however.  It would appear that there are business reasons that 
currently make it unattractive for Clearstream to operate in the UK directly.  
Moreover, it is not clear why the Bank of New York Depository (Nominees) 
Ltd was added to the chain of intermediaries in the Eckerle case. Clearstream 
would have been able to connect to CREST directly without the need for Bank of 
New York Depository (Nominees) Ltd to intermediate between them. Not very 
much is known about the economics explaining why long chains of intermediation 
have come into existence.71 It is possible that long chains of intermediaries have 
established themselves because of cost advantages between intermediaries who 
optimize their own cost base, but are not affected by the cost created by long 
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intermediation chains which are born by ultimate investors. There may also be 
other explanations connected with the fact that at present only a limited number 
of intermediaries operate across border in Europe. It is possible that it is not the 
interest of either of those to compete with the others. In those circumstances 
making it easier for the existing intermediaries to communicate with each other is 
unlikely to significantly reduce the length of intermediation chains.  
The target2securities project perpetuates the current market infrastructure 
which relies on intransparent intermediation and disconnects issuers from ultimate 
investors. It also facilitates a line of business which intermediaries with a custody 
business have in the more recent past increasingly developed.  It will help them to 
provide and promote the services of managing securities lending and tri-party repo 
transactions. The target2securities project does not investigate or address the 
incentives that have caused the current market infrastructure to emerge and 
investors will continue to work their way through a chain of intermediaries. 
Target2securities is not designed to better connect investors with issuers.   
It seems that the right solution given that this is technically possible would be 
for a mechanism to be created whereby irrespective of whether intermediaries are 
position between issuers and investors the system for holding and transferring 
securities records the name of ultimate investors on their books.  Given that 
reform is already under way to create a new computer programme for settlement, 
it would make sense to also fix the problem that investors are presently 
disconnected from issuers through intermediation at the same time. It would be 
also worth investigating the incentives that support the current market 
infrastructure. Levels of legal uncertainty would be significantly lower if there 
existed one central electronic system that held and transferred securities for all 
European jurisdictions and if that system was accessible directly by holders. 
Until recently it would not have been possible to create such a system not 
even at a national level. For example, when intermediation started in Germany 
during the 1930s, the means of communication were at a stage of development 
that required intermediation. It was not possible to create a central system which 
could be accessed by all German investors. Investors accessed their holdings 
through local banks which held deposits with regional banks which held deposits 
with the central depository. While it was not possible to create such a system when 
Germany created its central intermediary, there is no reason to conclude that the 
need for intermediaries continues to exist today. 
The same is true for the UK where, before CREST was put in place, it made 
sense to have shareholder registers administered in geographical proximity to 
issuers. UK issuers communicate with shareholders using the contact information 
contained in the register. Issuer need up to date information and prior to 
electronic means of communication that can best be achieved by placing the 
administration of the shareholder register in proximity to the issuer. Registrars 
developed as a branch of the financial services industry against the background of 
this requirement. This has changed. It is now possible to administer these holdings 
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centrally. Uncertificated UK securities and their transfers are managed centrally 
through CREST, an electronic system. Interestingly, however, registrars continue 
to maintain registers for certificated securities. It seems likely that the management 
of the relatively small number of certificated securities could now also be managed 
centrally and perhaps at a lower cost. 
At a European level the existing network of intermediaries was set up using 
methods that were created before electronic communication became possible. 
They have continued to operate notwithstanding the fact that it would now be 
possible to create a central European facility. This makes holding securities cross 
border expensive. The cost caused by inserting a significant number of 
intermediaries between issuers and investors did not matter much when cross 
border holdings were still infrequent. This cost did become a matter for discussion 
and possible reform, however, for the European Union which has set itself the 
policy objective to provide a framework which will facilitate a single European 
market. If the settlement and management of securities cross border are expensive 
that cost will be reflected in the terms under which issuers are able to raise money 
across the EU. 
It is important to discuss law, but it seems that this discussion is futile unless 
it is accompanied by a discussion about structural reform. It is worth asking the 
question about what would happen if a settlement mechanism was created from 
scratch using modern means of technology and communication. This is a question 
best discussed at an academic and government policy level rather than in 
consultation with organizations that have a vested interest in preserving the status 
quo. 
It is not a question to be put to existing intermediaries and other providers of 
the current market infrastructure. Existing market participants, for example the 
German and the French banking associations, have proven to be very committed 
to protecting their respective business models. 
The fact that incumbent market participants are unable to bring about reform 
if the increased efficiency involves reducing their own market was also 
demonstrated in the UK when the paper settlement system Talisman collapsed. 
The London Stock Exchange and its participants spent seven years and a very 
large sum of money trying to set up an electronic settlement system keeping all 
incumbent providers of infrastructure happy and taking away business from no 
one and failed. The Bank of England had to step in and take over the reform 
process. 
Consulting with existing intermediaries can only produce solutions that leave 
current levels of intermediation in place and is unlikely to produce a solution that 
reduces levels of intermediation. It seems that, at least at a European level, it 
would be right to go back to the Lamfalussy report and to conclude that the 
market has been unable to resolve the issue of excessive intermediation and it is 
now for policy makers to search for alternative solutions.72  
                                                     
72 Lamfallussy Final Report (fn 2) 16. 
